Abstract-This paper analyzes the security of the Yi-Tan-Siew chaos-based cipher proposed in [1]. It is found that the claimed key (α, β, γ, K) collapses to be (α, γ) under a differential chosen-plaintext attack, and that an intermediate variable (called noise vector) used in the encryption function does not have a uniform distribution, which will downgrade the security of the cipher. Also, analysis shows that the security of this cipher is independent of the use of the chaotic tent map, so that the proposed cipher literally does not provide useful experience on the design of the chaos-based ciphers.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
INCE the 1990s, chaotic cryptography has attracted more and more attention as a promising way to design novel ciphers, and this research has become more intensive in recent years [2, Chap. 2] . To evaluate the security performance of chaotic ciphers and to clarify some design principles, the cryptanalytic work plays an important role.
This paper analyzes the security of the recently-proposed Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic cipher [1] and points out some defects existing in this cipher: 1) the sub-key β should not be contained in the secret key due to its poor contribution to the security of the cipher; 2) the sub-key K can be cancelled by a differential chosenplaintext attack; 3) the noise vectors {U j } used in the encryption function do not have a uniform distribution, which downgrade the security of the cipher; 4) the security of the cipher is independent of the use of the chaotic tent map, but mainly depends on the mixing of three operations from different algebraic groups.
The first two defects mean that the claimed key (α, β, γ, K) collapses to be (α, γ), i.e., the key space collapses to be a half. All these defects will be analyzed in detail below. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section a brief introduction to the Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic cipher is given. Then, the first two defects of the cipher are discussed in Sec. III. The other two defects are analyzed in Sec. IV and V, respectively. The last section gives some conclusion remarks. Shujun Li and Guanrong Chen are with the Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Toon, Hong Kong SAR, P. R. China.
Xuanqin Mou is with the Institute of Image Processing, School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, Shaanxi 710049, P. R. China.
II. THE YI-TAN-SIEW CHAOTIC CIPHER
This proposed cipher is a time-variant block cipher based on the chaotic tent map. Each block has 4n bits, and the encryption function changes as the iteration goes. Given a plaintext P = (P 1 , · · · , P j , · · · , P r ) and the corresponding ciphertext C = (C 1 · · · , C j , · · · , C r ), where P j and C j are both 4n-bit blocks, the cipher is described as follows:
• The employed chaotic tent map is an extended version of the normal skew tent map F α :
where
• The secret key was claimed to be a 4-tuple key (α, β, γ, K), where γ is used to generate a secret initial condition x 0 of G (α,β) as follows:
Here, t representes the current time-stamp transmitted over a public channel. Since γ is only used to generate x 0 , the secret key can also be considered as (α, β, x 0 , K). Based on the secret key, the following secret functions are calculated for the encryption/decryption procedures: 1) A series of 4n-bit noise vectors U j = (u 4jn , u 4jn+1 , · · · , u 4jn+4n−1 ) (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) are generated from the chaotic orbit of the extended tent map G (α,β) with the following rule:
2) A series of secret permutations w ji (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · ; i = 1, · · · , n) are generated from U j and the subkey K, as follows:
where each v ji corresponds to a function w ji that represents a permutation of four integers {1, 2, 3, 4} (following the relation shown in Table 1 of [1] ).
(j = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) are generated from f ji as follows:
n +M 4 and "≪ 1" denotes 1-bit circular left-shift operation. 4) Another series of permutation function f
where f
is the inverse function of f ji , i.e., f −1 ji (f ji (X)) = X and "≫ 1" is 1-bit circular right-shift operation.
• The initialization before encryption/decryption starts is that C 0 = U 0 , P 0 = U 1 .
• The encryption procedure is
where ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR operation and a ⊞ b := (a + b) mod 2 4n .
• The decryption procedure is
III. THE REDUCTION OF THE KEY SPACE
This section discusses the reduction problem of the key space of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher. Firstly, it is shown that β is not an effective sub-key, so it should be removed from the key. Then, a differential chosen-plaintext attack is proposed to remove another sub-key K. As a result, the original key (α, β, γ, K) will be reduced to be (α, γ) when the proposed chosen-plaintext attack is feasible, and to be (α, γ, K) in other situations.
A. The Reduction of β from the Key
In the extended tent map G α,β , the parameter β will start to make influence on the cipher only after the chaotic orbit visits x = 0 or x = 1. However, the possibility of such an event is so tiny that the impact of β on the encryption/decryption procedures is computationally negligible from the probabilistic point of view.
Without loss of generality, assume that the map G α,β is realized in n-bit computing precision and that the chaotic orbit distributes uniformly in the discretized space, which is reasonable due to the uniform invariant density function of the skew tent map [3] , the probability that the chaotic orbit reaches x = 0 or x = 1 is p = 2 2 n = 1 2 n−1 . As a result, from the mathematical expectation of the geometric distribution [4, Sec. 6.1.3], the average position of the first occurrence of the above event (x = 0 or 1) in the chaotic orbit is 1 p = 2 n−1 .
For single-precision floating-point arithmetic, n = 30 (two sign bits are excluded), averagely 2 29 = 512M chaotic iterations are needed to activate the influence of β on the encryption/decryption procedures. This means averagely 2 29 8 = 64M leading bytes of the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted without any knowledge of β. Similarly, when the doubleprecision floating-point arithmetic (n = 62) is used, the condition will become much worse: averagely 2 61 8 = 2GG leading bytes of the ciphertext can be decrypted without knowing β! Therefore, in most (if not all) cases, β is not meaningful in the key. In fact, β is just a trivial parameter to avoid the chaotic orbit of the normal skew tent map F α to fall into the fixed point x = 0, which cannot be considered as part of a key for a cipher.
B. The Reduction of K under a Differential Chosen-Plaintext Attack
Given two plain-blocks P j , P ′ j , following j − 1 previous plain-blocks P 1 , · · · , P j−1 , one can get the value of ∆P j = C j ⊕ C ′ j as follows:
Assume CU j = C j−1 ⊞ U j+1 , then the above equation can be rewritten as
Now, consider such a question: what can we observe from ∆P , if P j and P ′ j have only one different bit? Assume that
and CU j = (cu 0 , · · · , cu 4n−1 ). It is obvious that P j ⊕ CU j and P ′ j ⊕ CU j also have only one different bit at the same position i. Then, further assume that
One has
.
and
. As a result,
which means that the i th bit is permuted to the l th position by f j−1 .
From the above discussion, one can immediately conclude that given the following (4n+1) plaintexts containing j plainblocks, one can exactly reconstruct the secret bit-permutation function f j−1 :
= (
Since the sub-key K is used only to determine {f j } (together with U j ), the reconstruction of f 0 ∼ f r−1 means the cancellation of K from the whole secret key (α, β, γ, K).
Thus, under the differential chosen-plaintext attack, the original key (α, β, γ, K) collapses to be (α, γ).
IV. THE NON-UNIFORMITY OF THE NOISE VECTORS
In the encryption procedure of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher, the noise vector U j+1 is used to mask the plaintext P j together with the previous plaintext P j−1 and the previous ciphertext C j−1 . To enhance the potential capability of resisting statistics-based attacks [5] , it is desirable that U j distributes uniformly in the discrete space 0, · · · , 2 4n − 1 . However, according to the analysis given below, Eq. (4) cannot ensure that each bit of U j satisfies a balanced distribution in the set {0, 1}, so that U j will not distribute uniformly in 0, · · · , 2 4n − 1 .
A. The Non-Uniformity when
In this subsection, it will be show that when α = 1 2 , the closer the α is to 0 or 1, the more severe the non-uniformity of U j will become. Similar to Sec. III-A, assume again that the chaotic orbit of the map G α,β distributes uniformly in the discretized space. It is then easy to deduce the following two probabilities: P rob{u i = 0} = α, and P rob{u i = 1} = 1 − α.
The above equation means that U j will contain more 0-bits than 1-bits when α > The occurrence frequency of U j = a ∈ {0, · · · , 255}, when (α, β, x 0 ) = (0.1, 0.7, 0.3) (1000 samples) of U j = 255 = (11111111) 2 is close to 0.5 but many others are almost 0.
Under the assumption that all bits in U j are independent each other, ∀a ∈ {0, · · · , 2 4n − 1}, one can theoretically deduce the probability of U j = a: P rob{U j = a} = α
4n−N0 , where N 0 ∈ {0, · · · , 4n} denotes the number of 0-bits in a. In total there are 4n + 1 different values of all such probabilities:
The non-uniformity of U j is useful for an attacker to get the value of U j quickly. Since the secret bit-permutation functions {f j−1 } can be reconstructed under chosen-plaintext attack (recall Sec. III-B), the attacker can successfully decrypt any ciphertext once {U j } are obtained. In fact, ({U j }, {f j }) can be considered as an equivalent of the secret key (α, β, γ, K).
To find the right value of U j , the following guess order of U j = a is suggested: ∀a ∈ A 0 ∪ A 4n , · · · , ∀a ∈ A i ∪ A 4n−i , · · · , ∀a ∈ A 2n , where A i (i = 0 ∼ 2n) denotes the set of all 4n-bit binary integers that contain i 0-bits. With such a guess order, the average number of searched integers (i.e., the guess complexity) Com(α) can be calculated with Eq. (12), where H(i) denotes the number of previous searched integers:
When n = 16, for instance, the relationship between the calculated complexity and the value of α is shown in Fig.  2 . Note that there exist calculation errors 1 that make each log 2 (Com(α)) a little less than the real value, but this fact does not influence the following qualitative analysis. From the experimental data given in Fig. 2 , one can see that the complexity is much less than 2 4n−1 = 2 63 (the complexity of the brute force guess of a uniformly-distributed 4n-bit integer) when α is close to 0 or 1. Apparently, the closer the α is to 0 or 1, the weaker the sub-key α will be. As a result, to ensure
the security of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher, the sub-key α has to be constrained in
, where Com(α 0 ) should be cryptographically large. This will further reduce the key space to some extent. From the discussion given above, α = 1 2 seems to be the best parameter to generate uniformly distributed {U j } that should maximize the value of Com(α). Unfortunately, according to our previous studies on the digital dynamics of piecewise-linear chaotic maps (PWLCM) realized in fixedpoint arithmetic [2, Chap. 3], α = 1 2 is the worst parameter from the viewpoint of dynamical degradation occurring in the discretized space, which destroys the uniform distribution of the generated pseudo-random numbers.
Actually, as a special case of the digital PWLCM, the chaotic orbit of G 1 2 ,β can be theoretically analyzed, which is similar to but a little more complex than the orbit of , one can get
It is obvious that will always lead to the same fixed point x = 0 after n x0 iterations.
For G 1 2 ,β , the introduction of β makes things a little complex: assuming that the binary precision of β is n β , the orbit of G 1 2 ,β will be in the following form:
That is, the chaotic orbit of G 1 2 ,β enters a periodic cycle determined by β after a transient stage determined by x 0 . The period of the final cycle is n β + 1.
As an example, the chaotic orbit of G 1 2 ,0.4 when x 0 = 0.123 is shown in Fig. 3 . Apparently, such a degraded chaotic orbit will generate badly non-uniform {U j }. When n = 2, experiments shows that the frequency of U j = 170 = (10101010) 2 is about 0.993, which means that the non-uniformity is even worse than the one given in Fig. 1 (G 0.1,0. 7 with x 0 = 0.3). One more example is given in Fig. 4 , where (α, β, x 0 ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.3) (only the value of α is different from the one shown in Fig. 1 ).
The above analysis shows that α = 1 2 is not a good (or even worse) parameter to use for generating uniformly distributed {U j }.
C. How to Mend This Defect?
Since the non-uniformity of {U j } is mainly caused by the fact that P rob{u i = 0} = P rob{u i = 1}, it is easy to mend it by changing Eq. (4) to the following one: It has been pointed out that dynamical degradation of G 1 2 ,β in the digital domain will influence the uniformity of {U j }. In fact, this problem exists also for any α = 
V. THE INCAPABILITY OF CHAOS FOR SECURITY
In Sec. IV-A, it has been mentioned that ({U j }, {f j }) is an equivalent of the original key. By studying the possibility of solving U j from chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs, it can be shown that the security of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher is independent of the use of the chaotic map G α,β .
Given a plaintext P j and the corresponding ciphertext C j , one can get Eq. (7) for U j+1 . Under the condition that f j−1 has been reconstructed, it is possible to solve U j+1 with a number of such equations. Apparently, the solvability of U j+1 is independent of the chaotic map G α,β . That is, the security of the cipher is independent of G α,β . In fact, one can replace the chaotic map with any other PRNG to generate U j , without influencing the security of the cipher. Therefore, the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher cannot be considered as a typical chaosbased cipher, and will not contribute useful knowledge or information about chaotic cryptography.
In the following, the solvability of Eq. (7) is discussed. Basically, the mixing of three different operations, XOR, modulo 2 4n addition, and the bit-permutation function f j−1 , makes it rather difficult to get U j+1 from Eq. (7). Rewrite Eq. (7) as follows:
C j ⊕ (P j−1 ⊞ U j+1 ) = f j−1 (P j ⊕ (C j−1 ⊞ U j+1 )) , (15) which can be simplified as
The task is to find a 4n-bit integer solution of x from a number of such equations. Considering that f j−1 contains n circular left-shift operations, it should have at least 2 n separate branches. This implies that at least 2 n points of intersection between the graph of a ⊕ (b ⊞ x) and that of f j−1 (c ⊕ (d ⊞ x)) have to be checked to find the only right integer solution of x. That is, the complexity is not less than O(2 n ).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the security of the recently-proposed YiTan-Siew chaotic cipher. Some defects of this cipher have been pointed out and analyzed in detail. The security analyses given in this paper should provide some reference for the design of chaotic ciphers in the future.
